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In the Supre1ne Court of the
State of Utah

METROPOLITAN \VATER DISTRICT ,.
OF PROVO CITY, a public corporation,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CASE
NO. 10,000

PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE

Respondent does not disagree with appellant's general
statement in this regard.
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT
The trial court found the agreement contended for by
respondent, and by its judgment gives effect to such agreement. Respondent seeks only an affinnation of the trial
court's Findings, Conclusion and Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth by appellant are essentially correct, except that we believe they need amplification in at least four particulars.
First, on page nine of its brief, appellant says that
"No contract exists between the respondent District and
the United States pertaining to this project." This is true,
but is somewhat misleading because the subscription contract between appellant and respondent dated September
18, 1937, specifically provides that the payments to be
made by the respondent District to the appellant Association sometime in the future are to be made to the appellant -Association and to the United States jointly. The
language of that contract was not changed by the Amendatory Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947, and
reads as follows:

"All monies payable hereunder by the District
to the Association on acCOWlt of (a) the purchase
price of tbe stock of the District in the Association,
and (b) of the default of some other stockholder in
the payment of the purchase price of the stock of such
other stockholder in the Association, shall be paid
by the District to the Association and the United
States jointly." (Pl. Exh. 4, P. 13).
Second, on page ten of its brief, appellant admits that
from 1947 through 1960, a period of 14 years, the auditor's reports on appellant's books show that the $6,000.00,
together with intere3: aecruals from the investment thereof, were credited to the stock subscription account of
respondent. The following language or language of similar import appears in the Annual Auditor's Reports on
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3
appellant's books made by various accounting finns covering the years 1947 to 1960, inclusive: (Pl. Exhs. 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22).

"Because of debt limitation restrictions, an advance payment of $6,000.00 was made by the Metropolitan Water District of Provo City to be held for
future application on its share of future U. S. contract obligation assessments. The amount advanced
to the Association has been invested in United States
Savings Bonds, Series "J". Earnings on these investments have been credited to the account of the Provo
Metropolitan Water District." (Pl. E~h. 22).
Third, on pages nine and ten of appellant's brief, it
is adn1itted that on March 14, 1947, being about six weeks
after the execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contract. a motion was passed by the Board of Directors of
appellant Association providing that the $6,000.00 paid
to appellant be not mingled with appellant's general funds,
but that it be placed in a separate account and invested art
the highest rate of interest consistent with safety, with
interest on the investment to accrue to the credit of re~pondent. The exact language of the minutes of the meeting appellant's Board of Directors held on March 14, 1947,
is as follows:

"It \Vas moved by Attorney Harris that the
~6.000.00 paid by the Metropolitan Water District of
Provo on its Subscription Contract be not mingled
\vith Association general funds, but that it be placed
in a separate account and invested at the highest rate
of interest consistent with safety; the President, Treasurer a..'ld l\Ir. Beesley be and are hereby authorized
to make the investment and report their action. In-
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terest on the investment to accrue to the credit of the
Metropolitan District. Duly seconded and passed."
(Pl. Exh. 1, P. 3).
As appears in the minutes above quoted, the motion
was made by Fisher Harris, who was the general counsel

for appellant and was also acting for respondent. Mr.
H·arris does not remember ever having made the motion,
but does not deny that it was made by him and that it is
a part of the official minutes of the appellant Association.
(T. 111). This motion sets forth the substance of the
agerement contended for by respondent and found by the
trial court.
Four1Jh, on page ten, appellant admits that it raised
no question about the entitlement of the respondent to a
credit of the interest accruals on the investment of $6,-

000.00 until March 11, 1955, at which time Fisher Harris
again advised the Board of Directors of appellant Association that the accumulations belonged to the appellant,
but .were to be applied on respondent's Subscription Contract debt when the first payment on that debt became
due. The exact language of the minutes of appellant's
Board of Directors in that regard is as follows:

"Mr. Harris, reporting the disposition of Provo
City's bond and interest (held by the Association)
said they belong to the Association as an advance payment on the Subscription Contract and that the
amo1Dlts will have to remain in the Association's custody until the first payment is ·made on the Subscrip tico Contract debt. Mr. Harris moved that the interest be invested in Government Bonds as fast as
amounts sufficient to make a purchase are accumu-
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lated. Motion seconded by Mendenhall and carried."
(Pl. Exh. 8, P. 2}. (Emphasis supplied}
In view of the somewhat complex nature of the facts,

respondent believes that a paraphrase thereof might be
helpful to point up respondent's position with respect to
this appeal. In so doing, the letter A will be used in place
of appellant, Provo River Water Users Association, the
letter D in place of respondent, Metropolitan Water District of Provo City, and the letter U, in place of the United
States. The citations designated, "Br.", are to page numbers of appellant's brief. Paraphrased, then, the facts
\Vhich we believe are material to a consideration of the
legal issues involved in the appeal are as follows:
Under a written agreement made in 1937, D would
become liable to A for 8,000 shares of A's capital stock
at some future time in an amount not to exceed $820,800.00. (Br. 4 & 5). The agreement provided that the
amount which D had to pay A for the stock and the times
of payment were dependent upon the amount and times
A had to pay U under another contract which .A ~had with
U, and which latter contract provided that A should PaY
the money it would collect from D, sometime in the future,
over to U. (Br. 4). In D's contract with A, D was obligated to pay the money whenever it became due to both A
and U, jointly. (Pl. Exh. 4, P. 13).
\Vith that situation existing, and no payments yet
due under the D-A contract, in November, 1946, A proposed that D's maximum liability for the 8,000 shares of
capital stock be increased from $820,800.00 to $1,231,200.00. (Br. 5, 6 & 8). (This figure is arrived at by adding
together the 5912,000.00 direct liability and the $319,-
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200.00 default liability.) For reasons important to D, D
did not want to be liable to A in excess of $1,225,200.00,
which was $6,000.00 less than A's proposal. (Br. 6). So,
D proposed to A that it pay to A $6,000.00 in advance so
that its total aggregate liability would not exce€d $1,225,200.00, if A would agree to invest that money until it became payable to U, and if A would also credit D with
the interest it might earn until that time. (Fdg. 6 & 7,
R-121). A's agent and attorney agrees to this, and thereafter D pays the $6,000.00 to A. (T. 42, 45, Fdg. 6 & 7,
R-121).

Thereupon, on February 3, 1947, the D-A stock pUTchase contract of 1937 was amended in writing and the
amendment recites that the new total aggregate liability
of D for the 8,000 shares of stock shall not exceed a total
sum of $1,231,200.00, less $6,000.00 previously paid by D
to A on the purchase price of said stock. (Br. 7, 8).
The exact language of the provision in the Amendatory Stock Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947,
With respect to the increase in D's total aggregate liability
is as follows: (Pl. Exh. 6, P 2.).
"15. Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, it is agreed that the total aggregate liability
of the District for payment under the terms of this

contract
(a) To the Association for the purchase of
the ·stock of the District in the Association shall
not exceed the sum of $912,999.00, less $6,000.00
previously paid by the District to the Association on the purchase price of said stock; and

(b) To the Association, on account of the
default of some other stockholders in the pay-
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ment of the purchase price of the stock of such
other stockholders in the Association shall not
ext·(~ed the sum of $319,200.00."
(Emphasis supplied)

The agreement or understanding which the trial court
fotmd with respect to the handling by A of D's $6,000.00
advance payment pending the time some amount actually
became fixed, owing, and payable, was not spelled out in
the Amendatory Contract. In any event, however, at the
first meeting of A's Board of Directors following the signing of the Amendatory Contract, the agent and attorney
of A, (who drafted the amendment) (T. 109, 110), made
a motion that the $6,000.00 be not mingled with A's gent'ral fund, but that it be invested at the highest rate of
interest consistent with safety, with the interest to accrue
thereon to the credit of D. The exact language of that
motion appears at page 3 of this brief, and in substance sets forth the entire provisions of the agreement
contended for by D, testified to by witness John 0. Beesley, and that found by the trial court.
For about 14 years thereafter, A carried not only the
So,OOO.OO, but also the interest earned by the $6,000.00,
on its books and records as a credit to D in compliance
\\'ith the agreement contended for by D and as found by
the trial court. In each and every year during those 14
years. the books of A were audited by various auditing
firms, and in every audit report the auditors .called attention to the fact that A's books showed that U. S. Governmetit Bonds costing $6,000.00 were purchased from the
Proceeds of stock subscription payments made by D to A
and that the interest received on the bonds was being
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credited to the subscription account of D. (Br. 10). The
auditor's reports were distributed to A's Directors in each
year. (Fdg. 13, R-123).

A's agent and attorney in the year 1955 again advised his Board of Directors that not only the $6,000.00
but also the accumulated interest earned by the $6,000.00
would have to be held by A until D's first payment '00.
came due undeT the subscription 'contract. A's Board of
Directors' minutes in this regard are quoted on page 4
of this brief.
For some Wlexplained reason, after crediting D's account with the interest accumulations for 14 years, A suddenly reverses itself and decides that the $6,000.00 paid
by D 14 years previous, as what it then and for 14 yean
thereafter recognized as an advance payment on a potential liability not then due, was really paid by D unconditionally and A could do with it whatever it pleased.
Therefore, A reasoned, the interest which had been earned
by the $6,000.00 is the absolute property of A, notwithstanding the previous action of its Board of Directors, and
A has no obligation to give D any credit for the same now
or in the future, and so appropriated it to its own use (.Br.
10).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE TRIAL
COURT IS AMPLY SU~PPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THE

AGREEMENT

FOUND

BY

THE
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TRIAL

9

COURT IS SUPPORTED BY AN ADEQUATE LEGAL

CONSIDERATION.
POINT ill
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IX>ES NOT PRECLUDE THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE TRIAL
COURT.

POINT IV
APPELLANT'S POINTS I, IV, AND V ARE ERRONEOUSLY PREMISED AND ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE

AGREEMENT

FO,UND

BY

THE

TRIAL

COURT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court found, in substance and effect, that
the $6,000.00 check delivered to appellant by respondent
on or about December 2, 1946, was an advance payment
on a potential liability of respondent to appellant. It further found that the advance payment was made upon the
mutual understanding of the parties that the proceeds of
the check would be invested by appellant at the highest
rate of interest consistent with safety, and that interest
earned thereon, as \Vell as the $6,000.00 advance payment,
"·ould be applied in reduction of respondent's indebtedness to appellant and the United States, jointly, as such

time as an actual payable indebtedness arose. (Fdgs. 6 &
7, R-121).
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~be e.~ctdffiee. s.upPQirting t}lese findings is as follows:
The testimony of John 0 .. Beesley.; a directorof both appellant and: respondent, that such was the
understanding at the time the $6,000.00 check was
delivered'. (T; 34 to 67) .
(1)

(2) The admission and ratification of appellant
in the form of a resolution passed by its Board of Directo['s at the first regular meeting of the Board after
tn.e check was, deli've:ced, which resolutiol'l sets. forth
the suh&~· of: the agreement conten.de.d. for by, re:spondent and found by the trial court. (Pl. Exh. 1,
P. 3).
( 3) The fact that appe1lant has carried the intere.st accumulatiol)$ attributable to. the $6,000.00 invested in U. &. Gov~rrunen:t BQnds_, paid to it by re.spondent, on its books and records as a credit to the
su"Q~iption. ~unt of r.espon~t every· ye<N:· ftom
1.9.47 tnr~ugp. 1960, inclusive. (Pl. Exhs.. 9· through

19. and 22).
(4) The fact that the books of appellant have
been audited by vario.us.. certified public accounting
firms. in each year 1947 through 1960, and in each
and ev.ery. such year the reports .of the auditors called
attention to. the-· fact that U. S. Government Bonds
costing $6,000.00. \Ver.e purchased from the proceeds
Qtf stock subscription payments . made by respondent,

a.~tl'Ct tnat. interest received on the bonds \vas

being

credited to the supscription account of respondent.
(R-24, 112; Pl. Exhs. 9 through 19 and 20).
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(5)

The fact that such audit reports were reg-

ularly distributed ta appellant's Board of DiFeetors,
and appellant issued no instruction& to, its audiit<YrS,
aeeountants or bookkeepers at any time from 1947
to l9GO,_ inclusive,. changing the method~ of handling
the interest accumulations. (R-26, 112, T-56, 112).
(6) Trte· fact that appellant produced no evidence· and· was unable to explain why- the resolution
C>f March 14, 1947, setting forth the exact agreement
COllm.tlded fur by· respondent was, proposed· by· Fisher'
Harris, (who drafted' the contract and carried the
negotiations)-, and was passed by· appellant's· Board
at DirK-OOPs. (T. 81, 112).

POINT II

THE AGREEMENT FOUND BY THE TRIAL
CVlffiT IS SUPPORTED BY AN ADEQUATE LEGAL
CONSIDERATION.

The consideration. for the agreement found. by the
trial cowt \vas the advance payment of $6,000:00 at a
til!lS! w.hen no monies were due. Another consideration
is respondent's entering into the Amendatory Subscrip•
tion Contract of F2bruary 3, 1947, increHsing respondent's
n1:edmwn total aggregate liability to appellant at a time
\vhcn the contract of September 18, 1937, providing fo~
a lower aggregate liability was still in effect. Respondent \Vas not legally obligated to do either, and either is
an adequate consideration for the agreement found· hy tlie
trial court.
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POINT

m

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT PRECLUDE TH1E AGREEMENT FOUN!D BY THE TRIAL
COURT.
kppellant contends that the agreement found by the
trial court alters, amends, or changes the tenns of the
Amendatory Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947,
and therefore is in violation of the parol evidence rule.
It is respondent's position that there is no conflict at
all between the provisions of the Amendatory Subscription Contract or.f February 3, 1947, and the agreement
found by the trial court. The written contract says in effect that the "tAltal aggregate liability" of the respondent
for payment under the terms of the contract "shall not
exceed" the sum of $1,231,200.00, less $6,000.00 previously
paid by respondent to appellant on the purchase price of
the stock. Respondent agrees both that the total aggregate liability cannot exceed the stated amount, and agrees
that the $6,000.00 was paid in advance on the purchase
price of the stock to reduce the proposed maximum total
aggregate liability by $6,000.00. Respondent does contend, however, that there was a further or additional agreement (the one found by the trial court), not in conflict
with the written document, which spelled out what appellant was to do with the advance payment of $6,000.00 until
it could be applied as the parties obviously intended, and
as required by the written contract, i. e., pay the same
over to the United States when the United States called
for payment under appellant's contract with the United

States.

(R-67).
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Under the well accepted doctrine of collateral contract, the parol evidence rule does not preclude parol proof
of a prior or contemporaneous oral contract that is collateral to, and not inconsistent with the written contract,
although it relates to the same general subject matter and
grows out of the same transaction. (20 Am. Jur. 993; 70
..\Lit 770).

This court held in Farr vs. Wasatch Chemical, 105
U. 272, 143 P. 2d 281, that a lessor's oral agreement to
make a leased warehouse tenantable could be proved by
parol evidence, and did not alter or vary the terms of the
written lease requiring lessee, after occupancy, to make
repairs and alterations . In its opinion, the court quoted
\Vigtnore on Evidence, Section 2430 as follo·ws:
"The inquiry is whether the writing was intended
to cover a eertain subject of negotiation; for if it was
not. then the writing does not .embody the transaction
on that subject . . . . . Whether a particular subject
of negotiation is embodied by the writing depends
\Vholly upon the intent of the parties thereto . . . . .
This intent must be sought . . . . . in the conduct of
the parties and the surrounding circumstances . . . . .
The question being whether certain subjects of negotiation were intended to be covered, we must compare the writing and the negotiations before we can
detennine whether they were in fact covered . . . . .
In deciding upon this intent, the chief and most satisfactory index for the Judge is found in the circumstances whether or not the particular element of the
alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in
the \vriting. If it is mentioned, covered or dealt with
in the \\Titing, then presumably the writing was meant
to represent all of the transaction on that element;
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if it is not, then probably the writing was not intended to embody that ele-ment of the negotiation."

Certainly, the written Amendatocy Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947, makes no mention of the investment of the advance payment of $6,000.00, and the
crediting of interest to the respondent in addition to that
payment. And, the motion of Fisher Harris passed by
appellant's Board of Directors on March 14, 1947, the subsequent crediting of the interest for a period of 14 years,
the fact that the motion was made by the same person
who drafted the written document, the fact that the written document provided that payments were to be made
to the appellant and to the United States jointly, and the
fact that a payment of $6,000.00 was made at a time when
no monies were due, also furnis,hes a sound basis for the
conclusion apparently reached by the trial court that the
parties did not intend to cover their oral agreement in their
writing. See also, Utah-Idaho Sugar Company vs. State
Tax Cc.mmission, 73 P. 2d 974, Nuttal vs. Berntson, 30 P.
2d 738, Garrett vs. Ellison, 72 P. 2d 451.
In Young vs. Texas Company, 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.
2d 1099, this court held that proof of an oral agreement
of a lessor to seek a variance in a zoning ordinance was
not inadmissible as varying the provisions of a written
lease.

The court stated:

"The answer to that contention is that such an
agreement made contemporaneously with the lease
as to the accomplishment of the objective and any
evidence on this subject would not vary the tenns
of the written lease, but would rather explain it."
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In the case at bar, it seems clear to us that the agree--

ment found by the trial court does not vary the terms of
the written document, and not only serves to explain it,
but also serves to explain all of the subsequent acts of appellant. including the motion of Fisher Harris of March
1~. 1947, and the manner of appellant's bookkeeping for
l~l years.
Aside from the agreement found by the trial court,
it is respondent's contention that the decree of the trial
court may be upheld upon at least two other theories.
First. That the $6,000.00 was paid to appellant by
respondent at a time when no monies were due, for the
sole purpose of discharging, pro tanto, a future indebtedness for appellant's capital stock, which money respondent is obligated by contract to pay to the appellant and
the United States jointly, and which money appellarit is
obligated by contract to pay over to the United States.
Under an elementary trust principle, where money or property is delivered by one person to another to be held or
paid over by the latter for a certain purpose, or generally
for the benefit of the former or a third person, an express
trust exists by inference. 54 Am. Jur. 70. Further, a
trustee is al\\·ays accountable for all profits and gains arising from the trust estate.
Second. \Vhile no case precisely in point could be
located, it seen1s to the writer that after appellant has carried the $6.000.00 as a credit to respondent on its books
and records for 14 years, and has likewise credited the
interest earned on that S6,000.00 to the account of the
respondent, that it could not now reverse itself and claim
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that the monies were improperly applied.
Jur. 803, wherein appears the following:

see,

40 Am.

"A creditor who appropriates a payment in a particular way is bound by his act and cannot afterwards
change the application without the consent of the
debtor, for the law regards the rights of the parties
as becoming fixed at the time the application is so
lawfully made, insofar as the original debtoc and creditor are concerned. Therefore, where there is no direction as to the application and it is entered as a
general credit on the general account, the creditor
cannot make an application afterward to any specific
part of the account to serve his interests as may be
subsequently developed."
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S PO·INTS I, IV, AND V ARE ERRONEO,USLY PREMISED AND ARE WITH01UT MERIT.

Appellant's arguments are based upon the erroneous
premise· that the agreement found by the trial court with
respect to the manner of crediting interest accumulations
is in conflict with the Amendatory Stock Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947, because it raises the "total aggregate liability" of respondent $6,000.00 above the amount
set fcrlh in the written contract. Such is not the case.
Respondent agrees, admits and contends that the
"aggregate total liability" of respondent to appellant for
the 8,000 shares of stock under the written agreement of
February 3, 1947, "cannot exceed" the amount stated in
the .written contract and agrees that this provision cannot
be varied by any oral agreement to the contrary. In other
words, respondent agrees that the total aggregate liability
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for stock "cannot exceed" the sum of $1,231,200.00, less
the $6,000.00 heretofore paid. By a simple arithmetic
calc'Ulation the maximum amount which the total aggregate liability "cannot exceed" is $1,225,200.00 Likewise,
respondent has not and does not contend that the $6,000.00
was not paid to lower by $6,000.00 a proposed "total aggregate liability" of $1,231,200.00, but on the contrary,
respondent asserts that it was. That is not to say, howe-ver, that respondent now owes the sum of $1,225,200.00
or any other amount, or at the time the $6,000.00 was
paid, respondent owed the $6,000.00 or any other amount.
The exact amount which respondent will owe and the times
of payment depends entirely upon what the United States
does in the future under its contract with appellant, and
the amounts will not be fixed and payable until the United
States takes some kind of action under its contract with
appellant. As heretofore indicated, our contention is that
at the time the $6,000.00 was paid, respondent owed a~
pellant nothing, does not now owe it anything, and that
the $6,000.00 was simply an advance payment on the stock
made by respondent pursuant to the agreement found by
the trial court. This contention in no way conflicts with
the written contract. w~hy, after recognizing the situation
to be exactly as respondent contends for 14 years, appel
lant now deterrnines otherwise, is beyond comprehension.
The trial court found that at the time of payment
there was a collateral oral understanding that the $6,000.00
advance payment paid to lower a proposed ''total aggregate liability " would be invested by appellant as the highl'St rate of interest consistent with safety until it became
payable to appellant and the United States, and that in
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addition to the $6,000.00 payment, respondent would also
be given credit for the interest earned thereon. Such
aggreement in no way conflicts with the written document setting forth that the total aggregate liability shall
"not exceed" $1, 225,200.00, or the recital therein of the
$6,000.00 payment.
Upon close analysis, appellant seems to say in points
I, IV and V that if the oral agre€ment is enforced, respondent really owes $1,231,200.00, not $1,225,200.00, and,
therefore, the oral agreement modifies the te,rms of the
written agreement upwards by $6,000.00. To state the
proposition is to refute it.
The oral agreement, confirmed by the Resolution
passed by appellant's Board of Directors on March 13, 1947,
has no effect whatever uporn the amount which respondent will ultimately be required to pay the appellant, except to reduce any such amount by the interest earned
and applied. Hlow can it possibly be said, then, that this
agreement conflicts with the written contract providing
that respondent's ultimate "total aggregate liability" "shall
nort exceed" $1,225,200.00, or that the proposed liability
of $1,231,200.00 has not been reduced by the $6,000.00
advance payment? Likewise, under what stretch of imagination, can it be said that the collateral agreement raises
respondent's total aggregate liability $6,000.00 above the
amount stated in the written contract?
As appellant's arguments in points I. IV and V are
premised upon the erroneous conclusion that the collateral
agreement raises respondent's total aggregate liability
$6,000.00 above the maximum provided in the written
contract, they are \Vithout merit.
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CONOLUSION
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that appellant
has performed no services for the $6,000.00 advance payment, and over the years, respondent has paid appellant
for water and other services to the same extent and in
the same fashion as all other stockholders in the appellant Association. (T-116). The $6,000.00 ·has at all times
been invested in U. S. Government Bonds, and these bonds
along with other bonds purchased with inteTest accumulations have been carried on the books and records of appellant Association in a special subscription account to the
credit of respondent.
Why, after recognizing for 14 years the entitlement
of respondent to the interest earned on its advance payment of $6,000.00 on a debt, not due when paid, and not
yet due, appellant Association suddenly decided to reverse
itself, has never been explained. Fisher Harris's motion
of March 14, 1947, passed by the Board of Directors of
appellant, and the manner in which the $6,000.00 ~has
been treated by appellant on its own books and recoros
should be conclusive upon this controversy. The minutes
of appellant's Board of Directors, as late as 1955 speaks
of the bonds representing the $6,000.00 and interest accumulations as "Provo City's bond and interest".
The trial court was convinced that respondent is entitled to a credit of the interest accumulations under a
collateral agreement made many years ago, which agreement was confirmed by appellant's Board of Directors
\\ithin six weeks after it was made, and which agreement
has been recognized and acted upon by appellant from that
time until shortly before this law suit was brought, a pe-
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riod of more than 14 years. Respondent respectfully submits that the Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment of the
tTial court ought to be affirmed, and that there is no factual, legal, or equitable basis for appellant's belated claims.
Respectfully submitted,
J. Robert Bullock, of the firm of
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSO·N
35 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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